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Abstract 
Migration and ethnic minority integration remain heavily contested issues in numerous 
European countries. Over the past decade, researchers and political commentators have 
observed an apparent retreat from multiculturalist policies, related to a belief that 
multiculturalism has lost support among the majority public. Recently, however, based on 
analyses of the evolution of migrant integration policies, it has been demonstrated that 
multiculturalist policies were largely left in place. To investigate the effect of 
multiculturalist policies on public opinion, we use a multilevel analysis of three policy 
indicators (MCP, ICRI-CD and MIPEX) and European Social Survey data in twenty 
European countries. Results show that multiculturalist policies, as measured by MCP and 
ICRI-CD, and migrant integration policies more generally, as measured by MIPEX, to 
some extent are associated with lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiments, while they do 
not affect public attitudes toward political institutions. Regarding political attitudes, 
especially respondents with higher education levels tend to respond in a more positive 
manner to multiculturalist policies than respondents with lower education levels. 
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Introduction 
Although the conceptualization of multiculturalism is highly contested, at least three 
different meanings of the term can be distinguished (Berry & Sam, 2013). Multiculturalism 
can be interpreted as a demographic fact, as an ideology on how to deal with cultural 
diversity, and as a public policy that is based on this ideology. Regarding multiculturalism 
as a demographic fact, it can be observed that most countries in Western Europe are 
confronted with an ageing population, and the most likely scenario is that immigration will 
be needed to sustain the labor forces of European countries in the coming decades 
(Coleman, 2006; DeWaard, Kim & Raymer, 2012). The implication of this scenario is that 
cultural diversity in Europe will continue to increase as it has done in the previous decades. 
Therefore, the discussion on migrant integration policies, and the future of 
multiculturalism as an ideology and public policy, is now as relevant as ever. At this point 
in time, however, the future of multiculturalism as an ideological or a policy concept is 
uncertain. On the one hand, prominent commentators have argued that multiculturalism is 
on the way out (Joppke, 2004). On the other hand, it has just as vehemently been argued 
that multiculturalism is still reflected in current migrant integration policies in many 
countries, and thus appears here to stay (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013) 
Following political theorists such as Kymlicka (1995), the political ideology and policy of 
multiculturalism can be defined as one that advocates equal recognition of the rights and 
the heritage of diverse cultural groups in society. In this contribution, we will investigate 
whether multiculturalist policies have an effect on public opinion with regard to 
immigration and ethnic diversity, as is often argued. To investigate this relation, we test 
how policies that should stimulate equality in the multiculturalist sense are related to 
public attitudes toward immigration and minorities, and to attitudes toward the political 
system. If the claim that the public in Europe has developed a negative attitude toward 
multiculturalism is valid, as current day political actors seem to believe, then policies that 
are regarded to promote multiculturalism can be expected to have a negative effect on 
public attitudes toward immigration and minorities, and a negative effect on trust in and 
satisfaction with political institutions. 
Our analysis builds on two lines of research. Sociological research, on the one hand, has 
previously focused on the effect of multiculturalist policies on integration outcomes such 
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as labor market participation (Koopmans, 2010). Research in the field of social 
psychology, on the other hand, has focused on the micro-level relation between support for 
assimilationist or multiculturalist ideologies and anti-immigrant attitudes (Verkuyten, 
2011). We use an interdisciplinary perspective, investigating the effect of  actual policies 
on anti-immigrant and anti-political establishment attitudes among the general public. 
We use data from the European Social Survey (5
th
 wave, 2010) to analyze attitudes toward 
minorities, immigration and the political elite. Based on the Multiculturalism Policy Index 
(MCP), the Index of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) and the Migrant Integration 
Policy Index (MIPEX), we investigate the influence of migrant integration policies on 
these attitudes in 20 European countries, using multilevel models. It has to be clear that the 
MIPEX index focuses on individual rights for migrants, and therefore should not be seen 
an operationalization of multiculturalist policies. The MIPEX index, however, can be 
considered as a proxy for the extent to which migrant integration policies encourage 
cultural diversity and take a more liberal (rather than restrictive) approach towards 
migrants. In this manner, it provides a useful counterpoint to the ICRI and MCP indices 
which more closely operationalize the extent to which migrant integration policies can be 
seen as multiculturalist.  
 
Multiculturalist Policies and Public Reactions in Europe 
Around the turn of the millennium, European societies have witnessed a strong backlash 
against the multiculturalist ideology and politics of the preceding decades (Taras, 2013). In 
an influential article, Joppke (2004) has argued that the retreat from multiculturalism was 
not limited to political rhetoric, but encompassed theoretical critique by political 
philosophers as well as a clear turn in the policies of Western countries that had previously 
pursued a decidedly multiculturalist integration agenda. Interestingly, the theoretical 
discussion was and is one within the liberal family of political theorists. Reacting on 
scholars such as Will Kymlicka and Bhikhu Parekh, Brian Barry (2001) argued that the 
liberal state should focus its efforts to promote recognition and equality on the individual 
and not on group rights. According to Barry, liberal policies should protect the individual 
against conflicting group interests and pressures. Moreover, Barry (2001) argued that 
policies in the liberal state should apply to citizens universally, precluding the need for 
group rights and recognition. 
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In the first decade of the new millennium, an alleged withdrawal from multiculturalist 
policies received much attention in the literature. As Joppke (2004) has described, several 
countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands apparently reformed 
their multiculturalist policies into more assimilationist ones. Especially the case of the 
Netherlands received much attention, a country which at one point followed a strongly 
multicultural approach, later followed by a turn towards conspicuously assimilationist 
policies (Vasta, 2007).   
However, the picture of a general retreat from multiculturalism across Europe has been 
qualified in recent analyses. The German chancellor Angela Merkel is often quoted as an 
example of the sentiment among European politicians that ‘multiculturalism has utterly 
failed’. However, a different picture emerges when we focus on actual policies rather than 
rhetoric of politicians. Analyzing policy indices such as the ‘Multiculturalism Policy 
Index’, Banting and Kymlicka (2013) argue that there is actually little evidence for a 
retreat from multiculturalism at the level of specific policies.  
As a consequence, there is still a large variety in migrant integration policies in Europe, 
ranging from more assimilationist to more multiculturalist policies, with Sweden being a 
notable example of the latter. Considering this variety and the fact that multiculturalist 
policies are considered preferential and important by members of minority groups 
themselves (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Modood & Ahmad, 2007), it is crucial to 
ask how the general – native majority – public reacts to actual policies, beyond the 
prevailing anti-multiculturalist rhetoric.   
 
Multiculturalist Policies and Attitudes towards Minorities 
Relations between multiculturalism, threat and prejudice have previously been investigated 
from a psychological perspective. There is a long research tradition in psychology that 
focuses on prejudice and anti-immigrant sentiments, which has subsequently been linked to 
popular support for multiculturalism. A key determinant of prejudice has been identified as 
perceived intergroup threat (Bizman & Yinon, 2001). From the perspective of realistic 
group conflict and ethnic competition theory, threat results from intergroup competition 
over scarce resources (Quillian, 1995; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). From the 
perspective of social identity theory, however, it has also been argued that threat and 
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prejudice arise from social categorization itself, and the related need for positive group 
distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Building on these studies, researchers have 
investigated the effect of perceived threat on support for multiculturalism, finding evidence 
for a negative relation (Verkuyten, 2009).  
There is less research, however, on this relation in the reversed causal direction, i.e., the 
effect of multiculturalism on perceived threat and prejudice. Nonetheless, some recent 
studies suggest that multiculturalism may very well affect intergroup attitudes. Schlueter, 
Meuleman and Davidov (2013), have observed a negative effect of more permissive or 
liberal migrant integration policies on the perceived threat posed by immigrants, such that 
living in a context with more liberal policies seems to be associated with reduced 
perceptions of threat. They argue that migrant integration policies can convey dominant 
group norms to which citizens conform, suggesting that such policies can function as a 
political socialization mechanism (Schlueter, et al., 2013). This reasoning is also supported 
by evidence from Kauff, Asbrock, Thörner and Wagner (2013), who have found that more 
liberal migrant integration policies can increase pro-diversity beliefs among the population. 
Contrastingly, however, in experimental studies among White Americans, Morrison, Plaut 
and Ybarra (2010) have demonstrated that respondents primed with multiculturalist 
messages can show higher levels of  threat to group values and higher levels of prejudice. 
Furthermore, Plaut, Garnett, Buffardi and Sanchez-Burks (2011) demonstrated with 
experimental studies among White Americans that majority group members tend to 
associate multiculturalism with exclusion rather than inclusion, in their words the “What 
about me?”-effect. The reasoning is that multiculturalism can lead to feelings of threat, 
because majority members can have the impression that minorities’ interests and values are 
prioritized over their own, when multiculturalism is framed as a concept that focuses 
(exclusively) on the emancipation of ethnic minority groups. In other words, policies that 
promote cultural diversity and group equality can lead to a threat to positive group 
distinctiveness among the majority.  
Following this reasoning and the experimental evidence, we suspect that multicultural 
policies may also have negative effects on majority members’ attitudes toward minorities 
and toward immigration. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H1: Policies that are aimed to strengthen cultural diversity will be associated with 
stronger anti-immigrant sentiments. 
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H2: Policies that are aimed to strengthen cultural diversity will be associated with 
stronger resistance to immigration. 
 
Multiculturalist Policies and Political Attitudes 
Policies that seek to promote equality and extend rights to minority groups may not only 
have an effect on majority attitudes toward minority groups and immigration, but they may 
also have an effect on attitudes toward the political establishment. Following the theory on 
social dominance orientation, it has been argued that majority members can have a 
preference to maintain their privileged positions over minority groups in society (Hooghe, 
2007; Pratto & Lemieux, 2001). This preference, together with perceived economic 
competition, can inhibit majority members’ willingness to help empower immigrants to 
attain positions of equality in society (Jackson & Esses, 2000). If the political 
establishment is perceived to implement policies that contradict this preference, than this 
may have a negative effect on attitudes such as political trust. In fact, research has 
demonstrated that there is a strong connection between anti-immigration attitudes and 
political distrust, which can be magnified by the adoption of multiculturalist policies 
(Citrin, Levy & Wright, 2014; McLaren, 2012). As argued by Kriesi et al. (2012), concern 
about migration flows is one of the main challenges for the legitimacy of democratic 
political systems in Western Europe. If there is a “What about me?” effect, apparently this 
also erodes the legitimacy of the political system as a whole. Therefore, we test the 
following hypotheses: 
H3: Policies that are aimed to strengthen cultural diversity will be associated with lower 
political trust. 
H4: Policies that are aimed to strengthen cultural diversity will be associated with lower 
levels of government satisfaction. 
 
The Educational Divide 
The contrast between the predictions based on theories of social identity theory and social 
dominance orientation on the one hand, suggesting a negative effect of multiculturalism, 
and predictions based on theories on group norms and political socialization on the other, 
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suggesting a beneficial effect of multiculturalism, provide an interesting puzzle (Morrison, 
et al., 2010; Schlueter, et al., 2013). One answer to this puzzle may be that different 
mechanisms operate among different sections of the population.   
Previous studies investigating the interaction between migrant integration policies and 
individual characteristics have focused on right wing authoritarianism and national 
identification. Research by Ariely (2012) shows that there is a negative interaction between 
liberal migrant integration policies – in terms of access to citizenship – and national 
identification, suggesting that the link between national identification and xenophobic 
attitudes is weaker in countries that have more liberal policies on citizenship acquisition. 
Kauff and colleagues (2013) found that in countries with more liberal migrant integration 
policies–, in general terms as operationalized by the MIPEX index, there is a stronger 
negative correlation between authoritarianism and pro-diversity beliefs. Interpreted 
conversely, this suggests that authoritarians respond especially negatively to liberal 
policies on migrant integration.  
An important trend that is receiving much attention in the current literature is the growing 
educational divide in European countries. A key group when it comes to possibly negative 
reactions to multiculturalism are what Kriesi and colleagues (2012) have termed the ‘losers 
in the process of globalization’. Kriesi and colleagues (2012) argue that increasing cultural 
diversity and shifting class divisions, both related to the process of globalization, have 
created a section of the public that has a more insecure and threatened outlook on society 
and is therefore vulnerable to prejudice and populist discourse. The literature suggests that 
education levels are the main divisive factor in this regard as education is a major 
determinant of attitudes on immigration (Kriesi et al. 2012). Education levels are strongly 
related to economic (im)mobility, perceived competition from migrants and, relatedly, 
ideological attitudes such as opposition to immigration, anti-establishment sentiments and 
support for right-wing populist parties (Werts, Scheepers, & Lubbers, 2013). Parallel to 
these observations, it can be expected that the educational divide in attitudes will also 
apply to reactions toward multiculturalist policies, as the lower educated are more likely to 
perceive these policies as prioritizing migrants’ interests over natives’ interests, or in other 
words are more likely to react to multiculturalism in line with the mechanism of social 
dominance orientation. Therefore, our final hypothesis is the following:   
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H5: Especially among lower educated groups, policies that are aimed to strengthen 
cultural diversity are associated with more anti-immigrant sentiments, stronger resistance 
to immigration, lower political trust and lower government satisfaction.  
 
Indices of migrant integration and multiculturalist policies 
While within the theoretical literature there is a not a real consensus on the meaning of the 
concept of multiculturalism, almost inevitably this also spills over into a discussion about 
what kind of indicators can be used to operationalize multiculturalist policies. Clearly, 
there is no overall consensus on what might be considered as the best operationalization, as 
all indicators that have been established have obvious merits and disadvantages. 
The Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP) that was designed by Banting and Kymlicka. 
This measure is based on eight policy indicators (the legislative affirmation of 
multiculturalism, adoption of multiculturalism in school curricula, ethnic representation 
and sensitivity in public media, cultural exemptions, dual citizenship rights, funding for 
cultural ethnic organizations, funding of bilingual and immigrant language instruction, and 
affirmative action policies), that capture the core of multiculturalism in public policies, 
namely the strengthening of cultural diversity. For this study, we use the version of the 
index that applies to immigrant minorities. In addition, Koopmans has developed the Index 
of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI), which uses 41 indicators across eight policy 
domains (nationality acquisition, expulsion protections, marriage migration, access to 
public sector employment, anti-discrimination policies, political rights, educational rights, 
and other cultural and religious rights). In this index, country scores on two major 
dimensions are calculated, namely support for individual equality and support for cultural 
difference. It is the latter dimension, support for cultural difference, that actually captures 
the multiculturalist character of integration policies, and therefore we use this sub-
dimension (ICRI-CD) in our analysis. 
Previous analyses on the relation between migrant integration policies and public opinion 
have most often relied on the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), instead of the 
MCP or ICRI indices. The MIPEX index closely corresponds to the notion of liberal 
integration policies, in that it evaluates whether countries have policies in place that help 
immigrants to attain equal status in society. The index is based on the evaluation of 
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policies by independent experts on seven different domains. These domains include 
policies that focus on labor market mobility, family reunion, education, political 
participation, long term residence, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination policies, 
each with four sub-domains (Niessen & Huddleston, 2009). Though the advantage of this 
measure is that it includes a large number of societies, thus allowing for a valid multilevel 
analysis, the disadvantage is that it is more a tool for benchmarking and policy evaluation 
than for capturing any ideological dimension of migrant integration policies. The defining 
feature of multiculturalist policies, that it allows and stimulates migrants to preserve their 
cultural distinctiveness, is not represented in the MIPEX index (Kauff, et al., 2013). 
The relative disadvantage of the MCP and ICRI-CD indices is that they include fewer 
countries in the study, fourteen and nine respectively that match the European Social 
Survey data we use here. The considerable advantage, however, is that they allow us to 
evaluate how public attitudes relate to multiculturalist policies specifically, rather than 
‘liberal’ migrant integration policies more generally as is the case with MIPEX. Because 
these three indices can be seen as the most important comparative data available on 
migrant integration policies, it is interesting to evaluate to what extent they lead to 
consistent results in terms of relations with public attitudes towards migrants and political 
institutions. While the MCP and the ICRI-CD offer the advantage that they can be 
considered as a theoretically informed operationalization of multiculturalist policies, it has 
been reported that there is quite some overlap in the sense that often the same countries 
adopting more liberal migrant integration policies in terms of individual rights also tend to 
adopt more multiculturalist policies (Helbling, 2013). This notion is also supported by the 
empirical data we use here, as the correlations between the ‘individual rights-focused’ 
MIPEX on the one hand and the ‘multicultural’ MCP and ICRI-CD on the other are .73 
and .79 respectively, thus quite high, for the countries where we have data on all three 
indices. Therefore, using all three indices allows us to combine their respective strengths, 
and gives an indication of the extent to which multiculturalist policies have similar effects 
as policies that focus much more generally on immigrant inclusion and individual rights 
for immigrants. The ambition of the current article remains limited to testing the effect of 
these indicators that were developed to operationalize multiculturalist policies. Whether or 
not these indices are actually successful in covering the theoretical notion of 
multiculturalism is a question that falls outside the scope of this article. 
 
10 
A Multilevel Analysis of European Countries 
Our analysis is based on a combination of data sources, which is necessary for our 
multilevel approach. The data applied here is based on the ESS Multilevel Data 
Repository. The individual level data is taken from the fifth edition of the European Social 
Survey, administered over the course of 2010 and 2011 in 27 European countries. The 
country level data is provided by Eurostat and the OECD, and prepared and made publicly 
available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). Additionally, the authors 
have supplemented these data with information from the Multiculturalism Policy Index 
(MCP) for 2010, and the cultural diversity sub-index of the Citizenship Rights for 
Immigrants (ICRI-CD) for 2008 and Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) for 2010 . 
While the MCP and ICRI indices are regarded the two most important indices specifically 
measuring multiculturalist policies (Koopmans, Michalowski & Waibel, 2012), the MIPEX 
can be considered as the most widely used comparative index on general migration 
policies. 
Only the twenty countries which were represented in both the ESS and MIPEX data 
sources and for which the additional macro data was available from Eurostat and the 
OECD were included in the analysis. These countries are Belgium, Switzerland, the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia and 
Slovakia. However, we have subsamples limited to fourteen and nine countries 
respectively for which data is available on the MCP and ICRI indices. Furthermore, 
considering the nature of our hypotheses, only respondents who are native born and whose 
parents are native born were included in the analyses, as including respondents who are 
first or second generation immigrants themselves would have required a different question 
wording. All in all, our analyses are therefore based on a sample that includes 32,806 
respondents. To deal with the problem of missing information on the different dependent 
and independent variables, we have used multiple imputation with five replication data sets 
in STATA. 
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Dependent Variables 
We analyze four dependent variables in this study: anti-immigrant sentiments, opinions on 
immigration, political trust, and government satisfaction. First, the variable for anti-
immigrant sentiments was measured with three items that were answered on an eleven-
point scale (0-10): ‘Would you say it is generally good or bad for the economy that people 
come to live here from other countries?’, ‘Would you say that cultural life is generally 
enriched or undermined by people coming to live here from other countries?’, and ‘Is the 
country made a better or worse place to live by people coming to live here from other 
countries?’. The items proved to be a reliable scale with a Cronbach’s α of 0.86. The 
variable score for respondents who had a missing value on only one of these three 
questions is based on the remaining two questions. 
Second, the variable opinions on immigration was measured with the following item: 
‘Would you want to allow many or few immigrants from poorer countries to come to live 
here?’. This item was answered on a four-point scale, with answering categories ranging 
from ‘Allow many to come and live here’, through ‘allow some’ and ‘allow few’, to ‘allow 
none’. 
Third, our variable for political trust was measured with three items, which allowed 
respondents to indicate their level of trust in national politicians, national parties and the 
national parliament, each on an eleven-point scale (0-10). These items proved to be a 
reliable scale with a Cronbach’s α of 0.92. The variable score for respondents who had a 
missing value on only one of these three items is based on the remaining two items. Lastly, 
for the variable on satisfaction with government, respondents were asked  the question 
‘How satisfied are you with the national government’, to which they could reply on a scale 
ranging from 0 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (extremely satisfied).   
Independent Variables 
The most important independent variables in our analysis are the three policy indices; 
MCP, ICRI-CD and MIPEX. With respect to each dependent variable, we compare the 
relations with these indices in separate models. Furthermore, to test our fifth hypothesis, 
we include a variable for level of education. This variable is a measure of the highest level 
of education attained in ISCED categories, ranging from 0 (less than lower secondary 
education) to 6 (higher tertiary education).  
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We have also included micro- and macro-level control variables that have been found to be 
influential in previous research on prejudice and political attitudes (Green, 2009; Werts, et 
al., 2013). On the macro-level, we include the minority population size. On the micro-
level, the control variables include age, gender and satisfaction with family income. The 
latter variable was measured on a four-point scale ranging from ‘Very difficult to cope on 
the current income’, through ‘difficult’ and ‘coping’, to ‘able to live comfortably on the 
current income’. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables included in our 
analysis. 
 
[ Table 1 about here ] 
 
Methods 
We have estimated multilevel regression models with the ‘xtmixed’ procedure in STATA 
12. This method allows simultaneous modeling of the effects of the country-level and 
individual-level independent variables (Hox, 2002; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). With 
multilevel modeling, variance explained by factors at the country level and variance 
explained by factors at the individual level can be distinguished. We have centered the 
independent variables on the overall mean because we also include interactions in our 
models. Further, we have applied the design weights provided in the ESS data in our 
analysis, which correct for country differences in sampling. It should be noted that twenty 
countries provide a relatively small number of level-two units in terms of multilevel 
analysis, and the countries can, moreover, not be seen as a random sample. This means that 
the results need to be interpreted with caution, as the limited (level 2) sample size increases 
the odds of finding statistical null results where relations are in fact substantively relevant 
(i.e. limited statistical power), and the non-random inclusion of countries limits the 
external validity of the analysis. We do have a rather representative sample of European 
countries, also in terms of diversity in migrant integration policies. However, because the 
number of level 2 units is even smaller with regard to the MCP and ICRI indices, we have 
taken care not to overspecify our models in terms of level 2 predictors. 
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Models and Results 
From the descriptive statistics, in Table 1, it can be seen that anti-immigrant sentiments are 
clearly present across Europe. The overall average is above the neutral midpoint of the 
scale, indicating that the public is slightly leaning towards a negative attitude toward 
immigrants. The same is true when we consider opinions on immigration. On average, 
there seems to be a negative rather than positive attitude. Political trust is on average 
actually well below the neutral midpoint of the scale, indicating a rather suspicious attitude 
toward national politicians, parties and the parliament. Regarding the last dependent 
variable, we can see that there is on average also a rather negative attitude in terms of 
satisfaction with the government in these twenty European countries. 
The scores on the policy indices suggest a wide variety in the extent to which countries 
have policies in place that support the integration and recognition of cultural minorities. At 
the high end of the scale, with a score of 7 on the MCP index and 0.44 on the ICRI-CD 
index, is Sweden. At the lower end of the scale, with a score of 1 on the MCP index and -
.40 on the ICRI-CD index, is Switzerland. Interestingly, the scores on the MIPEX index 
show a similar distribution between countries. In the nine countries for which there is data 
on all three indicators, the correlation between MIPEX and MCP is .73, and the correlation 
between MIPEX and ICRI-CD is .79. So while from a theoretical point of view it is very 
important to distinguish the concepts measured by the various instruments, empirically it 
can be observed that all three indices correlate very strongly. 
 
Multilevel Analysis of Integration Policies and Attitudes towards Minorities 
When we estimate an ‘empty model’ for anti-immigrant sentiments on all twenty countries, 
without including explanatory variables, it shows that the individual level variance is much 
larger (3.613) than the variance at the country level (.636). This is already important, as it 
indicates that there is much more variation in anti-immigrant sentiments within countries 
than between countries. Relatedly, what stands out in the first model in Table 2 is that the 
individual level independent variables strongly affect anti-immigrant sentiments. However, 
Table 2 shows that for the indices of multiculturalist policies, MCP and ICRI-CD (in the 
first and the third column of Table 2 respectively), the relations are negative, but not 
significant. The MIPEX index, on the other hand, is significantly negatively related to anti-
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immigrant sentiments, meaning that the more a country offers inclusive integration 
policies, the lower the levels of anti-immigrant sentiments are. This suggests that neither 
multicultural policies nor broader integration policies as measured by MIPEX exacerbate 
ethnocentric attitudes among the public; instead, the evidence suggests a tentative negative 
relationship, with such policies dampening anti-immigrant sentiments. To determine 
whether both observations are causally related, and if so, in what direction, falls outside the 
scope of the current article. We further find that anti-immigrant sentiments are negatively 
related to higher education and satisfaction with income, and positively related to age, and 
this is in line with earlier research. 
A similar picture arises when we analyze preferences with regard to immigration in Table 
3. We find in an empty model that the individual level variation (.696) is greater than the 
country level variation (.113), suggesting that attitudes toward immigration vary much 
more within national populations than between countries. However, the models for each 
policy indicator show that there is no significant relation between scores on the  MCP,  
ICRI-CD and MIPEX indices on the one hand and anti-immigration attitudes on the other. 
However, it is noteworthy that the relations between the policy indicators and anti-
immigration attitudes are consistently negative, suggesting that more multicultural policies 
and more liberal migrant integration policies are associated with a reduced resistance to 
immigration. Still, only individual level variables are significantly related to anti-
immigration attitudes. A higher education level and more income satisfaction are 
associated with less anti-immigrant attitudes, while higher age is associated with higher 
levels of anti-immigrant attitudes. 
 
[ Tables 2 and 3 about here ] 
 
 
 
Multilevel Analysis of Integration Policies and Political Attitudes 
As we have already noted, it could be expected that multiculturalist policies affect public 
attitudes toward national political institutions. For the results on the related hypotheses H3 
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and H4, we turn to Tables 4 and 5. First, as with the previously investigated attitudes, we 
observe that there is more variation between citizens within countries than there is between 
countries. An empty model indicates that the individual level variance (3.767) is about 
three times larger than the country level variance (1.258). Regarding our main independent 
variables of interest, we see that scores on the MCP, ICRI-CD and MIPEX index are not 
significantly related to political trust levels. Again, however, it does stand out that the 
policy indices are consistently positively related to political trust, in that more liberal 
integration policies and more multiculturalist policies at the country level are associated 
with more political trust. However, only a higher education level and satisfaction with 
income prove to be significantly related to political trust. 
Regarding our fourth dependent variable, satisfaction with government, we again find 
similar results. The empty model shows that the variation between countries is small 
(.138), while there is a huge variation within countries (4.362). Also regarding government 
satisfaction, we see that the MCP, ICRI-CD and MIPEX indices do not have a significant 
effect, though the relations are all positive. We find that a higher level of income 
satisfaction is associated with a higher level of government satisfaction. 
 
[ Tables 4 and 5 about here ] 
 
The Educational Divide 
For the results on our fifth hypothesis, we look at the second model for each dependent 
variable and each policy indicator in Tables 2 through 5, where we have included the 
cross-level interaction effects between the policy indicators and level of education. As 
stated in our fifth hypothesis, it could be expected that mainly among the lower educated 
multiculturalist policies would be associated with more negative attitudes toward 
immigration and cultural minorities, and with lower political trust and government 
satisfaction. We do observe significant interaction effects, which suggests that higher 
educated and lower educated sections of the population respond differently to 
multiculturalist policies and broader migrant integration policies. Looking at the second, 
fourth and sixth models of Table 2, however, this does not apply to anti-immigrant 
sentiments, as the interaction effects in Table 2 are not significant.  
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Regarding the other dependent variables, however, we do find significant interaction 
effects. For anti-immigration preferences, there is a small but negative and significant 
interaction between MIPEX and education level, as can be seen in the second model of 
Table 3. This suggests that someone with a higher level of education, who lives in a 
country with more liberal migrant integration policies, will be even less likely to hold 
negative attitudes toward immigration, when compared to individuals with more modest 
education in the same country. Furthermore, when it comes to political trust, we observe 
positive interaction effects between education level and both the ICRI-CD and MIPEX 
indices (Table 4). This means that someone with a higher level of education, who lives in a 
country with more multiculturalist policies and/or more liberal migrant integration policies, 
will have an even higher level of political trust, compared to individuals with more modest 
education in the same country. Lastly, regarding satisfaction with the government, we find 
positive interaction effects with respect to both the MCP and ICRI-CD indices. These 
positive interactions (Table 5) suggest that that individuals with a higher level of 
education, who live in a country with more multiculturalist policies, will have an even 
higher level of satisfaction with government, compared to individuals with more modest 
education in the same country.  
 
Discussion  
As Banting and Kymlicka (2013) have recently argued, there are still policies in place in 
many European countries that decidedly lean towards multiculturalism, in contrast to the 
popular contention that there is a general retreat from multiculturalist policies. Relatedly, 
we ask in this contribution how the majority native public reacts to these policies, to 
investigate further whether they are indeed as unpopular as is sometimes assumed. 
Basically our question was whether among the majority group one can observe a backlash 
against multiculturalist policies. 
Considering the belief that multiculturalist policies are in disrepute among the native 
majority groups of European societies, it could have been expected that policies that go 
against this sentiment would produce a backlash against political elites and have negative 
consequences for intergroup relations. However, we find that the public in twenty different 
European countries actually does not seem to react much to the policies in place, in terms 
of their attitudes toward immigration, their political trust and satisfaction with government. 
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The only exception is that we find a negative relation between more liberal migrant 
integration policies (i.e., a higher MIPEX score) and anti-immigrant prejudice, in line with 
previous studies on prejudice and immigrant threat (Ariely, 2012; Kauff, et al., 2013; 
Schlueter, et al., 2013). While we have to acknowledge that none of the three policy 
indicators we use offers a perfect operationalization of the theoretical concept of 
multiculturalism (MIPEX is not even designed to measure multiculturalism), the fact that 
the results for the three indicators are largely similar does strengthen our claim that 
multiculturalist policies apparently do not lead to a backlash among the majority 
population. Our data do not offer any indication whatsoever for the occurrence of the 
“What about me?” effect in Western Europe. 
So, how do the findings in this analysis contribute to the debate on the future of 
multiculturalism? Generally, our results suggest that the public concerns about 
multiculturalist policies are overestimated. We think that this points to a contrast between 
reactions to the multiculturalist ideology and anti-multiculturalist rhetoric, on the one hand, 
and actual policies on the other. Obviously, the notion that immigrants are less than fully 
committed to integration in host societies is not especially welcomed by some members of 
majority groups, as social psychological studies have often shown. Furthermore, the issue 
of migrant and minority integration, or assimilation, remains a popular theme in political 
debates. Especially among political actors situated at the right of the political spectrum, 
critique on multiculturalism and the intention to pressure immigrants and minorities to 
assimilate is often seen as a key ingredient of a potentially successful electoral campaign.  
In light of these debates, our results provide a more optimistic picture then studies such as 
presented by McLaren (2012), who found that concerns about immigration can lead to a 
reduction in political trust. On the other hand, research by Kesler and Bloemraad (2010) 
has already indicated that trust, civic engagement and political participation are not 
influenced negatively by cultural diversity and policies that promote individual equality 
and cultural recognition. Moreover, Ariely (2013), Kauff and colleagues (2013) and 
Schlueter and colleagues (2013) presented an even more optimistic picture, by finding that 
more permissive migrant integration policies are associated with a reduction in perceived 
threat and prejudice and more pro-diversity beliefs. Even when we use three different 
indicators for multiculturalist or liberal integration policies, our findings tend to support 
this more optimistic line of research. Our findings further stress that it is important to look 
at multiple indicators when assessing the impact of policies on public attitudes.  
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Moreover, our findings support the notion that different mechanisms could be at work 
among different sections of the population. Especially levels of education can function 
here as a major dividing mechanism in Western societies as the highly educated apparently 
react much more positively to multiculturalist policies than the lowly educated members of 
the majority group. In this sense, our results parallel recent studies which suggest that the 
key issue is how multiculturalist policies and diversity itself are framed and interpreted. 
Plaut and colleagues (2011) have argued that multiculturalism can be framed more as an 
exclusive or as an inclusive concept, from the perspective of White majority members, and 
that multiculturalism framed as an inclusive concept is associated with more positive 
majority attitudes. Relatedly, Guimond and colleagues (2013) argue that how attitudes 
such as prejudice are related to support for multiculturalism depend much on the national 
context and local norms associated with policies that support diversity, also suggesting that 
the key factor is how these policies are framed and conveyed to the general public.  
A possible conclusion based on our findings is that higher educated voters can interpret 
policies that support diversity more strongly in terms of inclusion. The lower educated 
sections of the population, on the other hand, may interpret policies that support diversity 
more in terms of exclusion, benefitting only minority groups and threatening the position 
of majority members, related to the anti-multiculturalist rhetoric of the populist right. This 
also relates to the argument made by Crisp and Meleady (2012), who argue that diversity 
or the ‘multicultural environment’ can activate two possible cognitive processes. One is the 
process of ‘coalition detection’, related to perceived threat from those regarded as 
outsiders. The other is the more complicated cognitive mechanism of ‘coalition building’, 
related to the notion that in an increasingly diverse environment where ethnic boundaries 
become less relevant, the more adaptive strategy is not to associate exclusively with co-
ethnics but to build associations across ethnic boundaries, creating new opportunities. It is 
quite feasible that the latter more complex mechanism, akin to ‘deprovincialization’ 
(Pettigrew, 2011), is more easily picked up by higher educated sections of the population. 
This would imply, however, that with regard to attitudes toward diversity and immigration, 
the differences between highly and lowly educated groups within the population can 
continue to grow wider. In sum, the implication is that there is no ‘singular’ general public 
when it comes to the issue of multiculturalism, but that it is seems easier for those who 
have higher human capital, experience more economic mobility, are ‘winners’ in the 
process of globalization in the terms of Kriesi et al. (2012), to take on an optimistic and 
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positive attitude towards cultural diversity. Conversely, building support for 
multiculturalism among those with more modest education and less secure economic 
positions does seem a formidable task for political elites, especially as there appears to be a 
strong link between anti-immigrant sentiments and political distrust, which can be 
enhanced by the adoption of multiculturalist policies, as shown by Citrin and colleagues 
(2014). 
A limitation to our present analysis, based on the MCP, ICRI-CD and MIPEX indices, is 
that the MCP and ICRI-CD indices have a limited number of cases in terms of multilevel 
analysis, while the MIPEX index was not designed to capture multiculturalism. As we 
have shown, however, the results of our analysis regarding public attitudes toward 
migrants and the political establishment are remarkably consistent across the three 
indicators. Therefore, we believe that it is relevant to show how actual policies  could be 
associated with negative attitudes toward minorities, or to a possible backlash against 
political elites and institutions. Based on the currently available indicators, we can arrive at 
the conclusion that there is no evidence at all for a popular backlash against multiculturalist 
or liberal integration policies although there is a danger for a deepening divide between het 
highly and the lowly educated members of society. If, however, indicators of 
multiculturalist policies will become available for more countries in the years ahead, it is 
all the more crucial to conduct a similar analysis based on these more elaborated 
indicators. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of dependent, independent and control variables 
               (20 countries; N=32,806) 
 Min.    Max. Mean /  
Proportion 
SD 
Dependent variables     
Anti-immigrant sentiments      0 10 5.18 2.07 
Anti-immigration preferences 0 3 1.66 .90 
Political trust                       0 10 3.57 2.23 
Government satisfaction     0 10 3.86 2.43 
Independent variables     
Multiculturalism policy index (MCP)
1 
0 7 3.41 1.77 
Citizenship Rights for Immigrants Index (ICRI-CD)
2 
-.40 .44 .05 .29 
Migrant integration policy index (MIPEX)   36 83 55.66 12.10 
Education level                               0 6 2.60 1.85 
Individual level controls     
Age 14 101 48.82 18.77 
Gender (male) 0 1 .53  
Income satisfaction 0 3 1.95 .88 
Country level control     
Minority population size  (% of the population)        .12 21.90 6.65 4.43 
Source: ESS5 survey, 2010; MCP, 2010; ICRI-CD, 2008; MIPEX, 2010; OECD, 2010 – own calculations. 
Notes: 
1
 based on the available data for 14 countries; 
2
 based on the available data for 9 countries. 
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Table 2. Multilevel regression models for anti-immigrant sentiments  
Source: ESS5 survey, 2010; MCP, 2010; ICRI-CD, 2008; MIPEX, 2010; OECD, 2010 – own calculations. Sign. (two-tailed): * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.   
Note: Entries are the result of six separate multilevel regression analyses. 
 
  
 MCP ICRI-CD MIPEX 
    B SE  P     B SE  P     B SE  P     B SE  P     B SE  P     B SE  P 
Independent variables                   
Policy index  -.070 .108  -.075 .107  -.411 .803  -.421 .792  -.025 .011 * -.023 .011 * 
Education  -.271 .022 *** -.278 .023 *** -.322 .024 *** -.323 .021 *** -.241 .022 *** -.244 .022 *** 
Policy index * Education     .008 .012     .106 .078     -.001 .002  
Individual level controls                   
Age .003 .001 * .003 .001 * .005 .002 ** .005 .002 ** .006 .002 ** .006 .002 *** 
Gender (female) .039 .053  .040 .053  -.016 .049  -.012 .048  .021 .047  .016 .048  
Income satisfaction -.325 .033 *** -.337 .031 *** -.321 .059 *** -.324 .057 *** -.328 .028 *** -.337 .027 *** 
Country level control                    
Minority population size -.007 .033  -.010 .033  -.026 .026  -.027 .025  -.003 .035  -.003 .034  
Intercept 5.549 .338 *** 5.581 .335 *** 5.485 .265 *** 5.501 .255 *** 5.495 .308 *** 5.520 .301 *** 
Random Part                   
Residual variance 3.215  3.193  3.175  3.161  3.261  3.236  
Variance RI .472  .460  .254  .243  .383  .382  
Variance RS     .007     .003     .008  
R
2
 – individual level  .118   .124   .135   .139   .097   .104  
R
2
 – country level  .319   .336   .306   .336   .397   .399  
N                   
Countries 14 14 9 9 20 20 
Individuals 23,439 23,439 13,572 13,572 32,806 32,806 
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Table 3. Multilevel regression models for anti-immigration preferences  
Source: ESS5 survey, 2010; MCP, 2010; ICRI-CD, 2008; MIPEX, 2010; OECD, 2010 – own calculations. Sign. (two-tailed): * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.   
Note: Entries are the result of six separate multilevel regression analyses. 
 
  
 MCP ICRI-CD MIPEX 
    B SE  P     B SE  P     B SE  P     B SE  P     B SE  P     B SE  P 
Independent variables                   
Policy index  -.041 .052  -.042 .052  -.257 .378  -.258 .380  -.009 .007  -.009 .007  
Education  -.083 .005 *** -.084 .005 *** -.096 .003 *** -.096 .003 *** -.073 .006 *** -.072 .006 *** 
Policy index * Education     .002 .002 
 
   .015 .009 
 
   -.001 .000 * 
Individual level controls                   
Age .006 .001 *** .006 .001 *** .007 .001 *** .007 .001 *** .007 .001 *** .007 .001 *** 
Gender (female) -.017 .023  -.018 .023  -.037 .019 
 
-.037 .019 
 
-.023 .018  -.025 .018  
Income satisfaction -.083 .014 *** -.083 .014 *** -.063 .014 *** -.063 .014 *** -.087 .013 *** -.088 .012 *** 
Country level control                    
Minority population size -.012 .007 
 
-.012 .007 
 
-.008 .007  -.008 .007  .001 .015  .001 .015  
Intercept 1.572 .108 *** 1.570 .109 *** 1.361 .053 *** 1.360 .053 *** 1.496 .144 *** 1.497 .142 *** 
Random Part                   
Residual variance .627  .626  .615  .615  .644  .643  
Variance RI .076  .076  .053  .053  .083  .083  
Variance RS     .000     .000     .000  
R
2
 – individual level  .089   .090  .090  .090   .075   .076  
R
2
 – country level  .269   .269  .209  .209   .265   .265  
N                   
Countries 14 14 9 9 20 20 
Individuals 23,439 23,439 13,572 13,572 32,806 32,806 
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Table 4. Multilevel regression models for political trust 
Source: ESS5 survey, 2010; MCP, 2010; ICRI-CD, 2008; MIPEX, 2010; OECD, 2010 – own calculations. Sign. (two-tailed): * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.   
Note: Entries are the result of six separate multilevel regression analyses. 
 
  
 MCP ICRI-CD MIPEX 
    B SE  P     B SE  P     B SE  P     B SE  P     B SE  P     B SE  P 
Independent variables                   
Policy index  .021 .156 
 
.019 .153 
 
.628 1.073 
 
.630 1.068 
 
.031 .017 
 
.031 .016 
 
Education  .074 .022 ** .077 .020 *** .107 .023 *** .101 .016 *** .067 .018 *** .066 .013 *** 
Policy index * Education     .013 .011     .162 .050 **    .004 .001 *** 
Individual level controls                   
Age -.000 .002  -.001 .002  -.004 .002 
 
-.003 .002 
 
.000 .002  .000 .002  
Gender (female) -.003 .037  -.003 .037  .038 .019 * .034 .017 
 
.035 .033  .037 .033  
Income satisfaction .447 .047 *** .458 .044 *** .499 .052 *** .503 .053 *** .414 .035 *** .424 .034 *** 
Country level control                    
Minority population size .003 .064  .001 .064  .029 .049  .030 .049  .048 .033  .046 .034  
Intercept 3.044 .653 *** 3.056 .646 *** 3.291 .612 *** 3.269 .619 *** 2.527 .314 *** 2.528 .311 *** 
Random Part                   
Residual variance 3.458  3.436  3.334  3.325  3.636  3.618  
Variance RI 1.044  1.016  .524  .518  .765  .735  
Variance RS     .005     .001    .003  
R
2
 – individual level .048  .054   .070   .073   .035   .040  
R
2
 – country level .286  .305   .269   .278   .392   .416  
N                   
Countries 14 14 9 9 20 20 
Individuals 23,439 23,439 13,572 13,572 32,806 32,806 
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Table 5. Multilevel regression models for satisfaction with government 
Source: ESS5 survey, 2010; MCP, 2010; ICRI-CD, 2008; MIPEX, 2010; OECD, 2010 – own calculations. Sign. (two-tailed): * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.   
Note: Entries are the result of six separate multilevel regression analyses.  
 
 MCP ICRI-CD MIPEX 
    B SE  P     B SE  P     B SE  P     B SE  P     B SE  P     B SE  P 
Independent variables                   
Policy index  .140 .155 
 
.133 .154 
 
1.543 .894 
 
1.523 .879 
 
.016 .021  .016 .021  
Education  -.007 .027  -.008 .016  -.006 .038  -.010 .021  .007 .021  .012 .021  
Policy index * Education     .037 .004 ***    .264 .060 ***    .001 .002  
Individual level controls                   
Age .003 .003  .003 .002  .001 .003  .002 .003  .002 .002  .002 .002  
Gender (female) -.038 .053  -.043 .054  -.016 .069  -.021 .069  -.016 .043  -.021 .043  
Income satisfaction .491 .055 *** .501 .054 *** .547 .066 *** .552 .067 *** .499 .042 *** .506 .041 *** 
Country level control                    
Minority population size .029 .082  .027 .082  .090 .042 * .090 .042 * .031 .046  .030 .047  
Intercept 2.720 .676 *** 2.702 .672 *** 2.568 .410 *** 2.540 .421 *** 2.722 .348 *** 2.712 .346 *** 
Random Part                   
Residual variance 4.291  4.266  4.454  4.429  4.514  4.490  
Variance RI 1.174  1.162  .515  .505  .966  .959  
Variance RS     .002     .002     .007  
R
2
 – individual level  .037   .043   .038   .043   .030   .036  
R
2
 – country level  .274   .281   .404   .416   .251   .257  
N                   
Countries 14 14 9 9 20 20 
Individuals 23,439 23,439 13,572 13,572 32,806 32,806 
